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THOSE WHO REMEMBER THE PAST MAY 
NOT BE CONDEMNED TO REPEAT IT* 
Stephan Landsmant 
STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS. By Gary Jonathan Bass. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 2000. Pp. 402. $29.95. 
THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LA W  AND HISTORY IN THE 
TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST. By Lawrence Douglas. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 2001. Pp. xiii, 318. $35. 
FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR. 
By Richard J. Goldstone. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2000. 
Pp. xxiii, 152. $18.50. 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE. 
By Geoffrey Robertson. New York: The New Press. 2000. Pp. xxxiv, 
554. $30. 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Hague, Slobodan Milosevic is on trial for crimes committed 
in Bosnia, Kosovo and Croatia;1 in Arusha, Tanzania, Jean Paul 
Akayasu, a Rwandan bourgmestre, was convicted of genocide;2 in 
London, Augusto Pinochet was detained and adjudged amenable to 
an arrest warrant issued by a Spanish magistrate for acts of torture 
* This title refers to the famous observation of George Santayana, "Those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it." GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF 
REASON (1905-06) quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 703 (15th ed. 1980). 
' Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University, 
College of Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon; J.D. 1972, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. See Suzanne Daley, Milosevic Faces Single Trial Asked by Hague Prosecution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at A4. 
2. See Judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), available at http://222.un.org/ictr/english/ 
judgments/akayesu.html (a Rwandan bourgmestre is the elected leader of a commune some­
thing akin to the mayor of a city). 
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carried out in Chile;3 in Belgium, a Hutu Roman Catholic former 
mother superior was convicted of complicity in the Rwandan geno­
cide;4 and in Rome a treaty was signed commencing the process that 
will result in the creation of the International Criminal Court 
("ICC").5 All these events underscore the startling growth of efforts to 
establish a worldwide criminal process capable of punishing heinous 
crimes ranging from genocide to grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. Though the pace of change has been dramatic over the 
past few years, the forces driving it have been building up for at least 
half a century. 
Each of the four books under review is, in one way or another, de­
signed to address the process of transition from a regime of strict na­
tional sovereignty and local prosecution of criminal acts to an interna­
tional one in which major abuses can and will be punished in courts 
around the world. Two of these volumes, Gary Bass's, Stay the Hand 
of Vengeance, and Lawrence Douglas's, The Memory of Judgment, 
provide excellent scholarly analyses of various historical aspects of the 
growth of international criminal prosecution. A third, Justice Richard 
Goldstone's, For Humanity, provides the recollections of one of the 
architects of transformation about his work as chief prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")6 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR").7 The 
fourth book, Geoffrey Robertson's, Crimes Against Humanity, is far 
weaker than the others, and presents an idiosyncratic and polemical 
assessment of some of the matters addressed in the other volumes. 
Part I of this Review examines some of the critical events that have 
contributed to the current upsurge in international criminal prosecu­
tions. Then each of the four books is discussed. The Review concludes 
with two suggestions, one a potentially useful means of explaining why 
change has taken place, the other an exploration of the role of truth 
commissions in the prosecutorial effort. 
I. THE PAST AS PROLOGUE - TRACING THE UPSURGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
While precedent-establishing international prosecution of grave 
misconduct had to await the conclusion of the Second World War, 
3. See ROBERTSON, pp. 388-98. 
4. See Marlise Simons, Mother Superior Guilty in Rwandan Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2001, at A4. 
5. See GOLDSTONE, pp. 120-38. 
6. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 
(1993) (approving the Yugoslavia Tribunal). 
7. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 
(1994) (approving the Rwanda Tribunal). 
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there were rumblings in Europe about the need for some international 
mechanism to punish the serious misdeeds of military leaders and 
their minions a good deal earlier. In 1815, there were discussions 
about prosecuting Napoleon in response to his efforts to subjugate all 
of Europe by force of arms.8 Eventually, the British concluded that 
such a trial was not worthwhile, although several of Bonaparte's most 
famous subordinates, Michel Ney and Charles de la Bedoyere, were 
tried and convicted in French courts.9 
The idea of using legal prosecution to punish grave misconduct 
during armed conflicts was revived during the First World War in re­
sponse to two very different problems. The first of these was the 
Turkish program carried out during 1915 to murder the Armenian mi­
nority within its borders.10 The second was the allegedly unlawful tac­
tics adopted by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his generals in their efforts to 
secure a German victory over the Allied forces arrayed against them.11 
The British were the chief proponents of criminal prosecutions in both 
cases. 
A. Armenians and Turks 
After the Allied victory over the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Britain 
pressed the newly installed Turkish government to prosecute, while 
His Majesty's Government moved to incarcerate those Turkish lead­
ers deemed responsible for the slaughter of as many as 1 ,000,000 
Armenians in 1915. This British effort was fueled by strong domestic 
antipathy toward the Muslim Turks for their unspeakable barbarity 
toward the Armenian Christians. A large number of Turkish leaders 
were seized, but the criminal process bogged down both because of 
proof problems and concerns over the fairness of the proceedings. As 
time dragged on, prosecutorial momentum was lost. Eventually, the 
British dramatically reduced the size of their occupation force in the 
Ottoman Empire. This had the effect of reducing British authority and 
leverage with respect to prosecutions. A group of ardent Turkish Na­
tionalists (the "Young Turks"), led by Mustafa Kemal Atattirk, seized 
on the issue of prosecutions as one of several grievances warranting 
rebellion against the post-war Turkish regime. During the ensuing civil 
war, the Nationalists took British hostages. Rather than risk the hos­
tages' lives or commit British troops to combat with the Nationalists, 
the British government decided to abandon its insistence upon prose-
8. See BASS, pp. 37-57. 
9. See id. at 39. 
10. My discussion of Turkey's genocidal attack on the Armenians and its legal aftermath 
is based on BASS, pp. 106-46. 
11. My discussion of the Allied efforts to prosecute Wilhelm II and alleged German war 
criminals is based on BASS, pp. 58-105. 
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cution. The delay in mounting trials, along with Turkish backlash 
against British intervention and a lack of complete British military 
dominance, all worked to undermine legal action against what may 
have been the first twentieth century genocide. 
B. Pursuing the Kaiser 
The immense blood letting on the Western Front, the wide-ranging 
use of submarine warfare, the Zeppelin attacks from the air on civilian 
targets, the use of poison gas, and disregard for the neutral status of a 
number of nations all fed an Allied clamoring for the prosecution of 
the leaders of the German war effort, most particularly the German 
head of state, Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Kaiser, however, fled Germany 
at the end of the war and took refuge in the Netherlands, which 
granted him asylum. The British and French were outraged and de­
manded that Wilhelm be turned over to an international tribunal for 
prosecution. These demands were resisted not only by Germany and 
the Netherlands, but also by the United States, which proposed an in­
ternational commission of inquiry rather than a trial. In the end, the 
Kaiser was not prosecuted. Instead, Germany agreed to a small num­
ber of war crimes trials to be held before the German Supreme Court 
in Leipzig. These cases were a fiasco - either the accused were ac­
quitted or given incredibly lenient sentences. Since the Allies had not 
occupied Germany at the end of the war, they had no recourse short 
of invasion. This choice proved unpalatable, and there the question of 
prosecution ended, but not before the experience soured a generation 
of British officials (including Winston Churchill) on international 
prosecutions and embittered Germans not only against the Allies, but 
against the newly established Weimar Republic as well. 
C. Nuremberg 
Thus, it was in a historical context of failure and frustration that 
debate about prosecution arose during World War II. As the tide of 
battle turned against the Nazis, discussions began about post-war 
punishment of war criminals. In 1943, representatives of Great Britain, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR") , and the United 
States met in Moscow and declared: 
[T]hose German officers and men and members of the Nazi party ... 
who have been responsible for ... atrocities, massacres and executions 
will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were 
done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the 
laws of these liberated countries. The above declaration is without preju­
dice to the case of the major war criminals whose offenses have no par-
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ticular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint 
decision of the governments of the allies.12 
While this declaration did not settle precisely how war criminals would 
be dealt with, it did contemplate prosecution at the scene of the crime 
for lesser criminals as well as some as yet unspecified process for the 
newly minted category of "major war criminals." 
By mid-1944, the end of the war was in sight and the debate about 
the handling of war criminals intensified. In light of their World War I 
experience the British, particularly Churchill, pressed for summary 
execution of major war criminals. Although some factions of the 
American government were sympathetic to this idea, others (centered 
around the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson) vigorously opposed any 
solution that did not " 'embody . . .  at least the rudimentary aspects of 
the [American] Bill of Rights, namely notification of the accused of 
the charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable limits, to call 
witnesses in his own defense.' "13 Surprisingly, even Stalin opposed the 
British on summary executions, declaring " '[t]here must be no execu­
tion without trial otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try 
them.' "14 What Stalin may have had in mind, however, was not 
American-style trials but "show" trials of the sort he stage-managed in 
Moscow during the 1930s15 and the Soviets used in Kharkov in 
December 1943 to convict three Germans and a Soviet accused of 
atrocities.16 
After long and difficult negotiations, the American approach was 
adopted and the Allies agreed, in the so-called London Agreement 
and Charter, to create an International Military Tribunal ("IMT") to 
try leading Nazi war criminals.17 Although the tribunal bore the name 
"Military," it was not designed or intended as a court martial but 
rather as a proceeding with the fundamental attributes of civilian 
criminal justice. 18 The first (and only) trial to be conducted by the IMT 
took place in Nuremberg, Germany, beginning on November 20, 1945. 
This trial had two principal purposes. The first was the traditional one 
12. Moscow Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943, reproduced in EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE 
TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 4-5 (1966). 
13. Memorandum from Henry Stimson to John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War 
(Sept. 9, 1944) quoted in ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 54 (1983). 
14. Letter from Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Oct. 22, 1944) (detailing 
conversation Churchill had with Stalin) quoted in TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF 
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 31 (1992). 
15. For a powerful description and analysis of the Moscow Show Trials, see ROBERT 
CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR (1973). 
16. See WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 6 (1999). 
17. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal is reproduced as Appendix A in 
TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 645-53. 
18. See JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG- INFAMY ON TRIAL 464-65 n.34 (1994). 
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of punishing top Nazi leaders for the crimes they had personally com­
mitted during the Third Reich. The second was something quite dif­
ferent. It had little to do with the defendants at all - the goal was to 
create an indelible record of Nazi tyranny from 1933 until Germany's 
defeat in 1945. As Secretary of War Stimson described this objective, 
the trial was to be used as a "way of making a record of the Nazi sys­
tem of terrorism and the effort of the Allies to terminate the system 
and prevent its recurrence. "19 There were a number of motives behind 
this second objective. Churchill, Roosevelt, and other Western leaders 
had been obliged, before the start of World War II, to deal with revi­
sionist claims about the First World War. In the United States, such 
revisionism reinforced a tendency toward isolationism and in Britain, 
an inclination toward appeasement. There appeared to be a feeling 
among key leaders that such problems should never be allowed to 
arise with respect to the Second World War. As Judge Samuel 
Rosenman, a Roosevelt confidant, said of his leader: 
He was determined that the question of Hitler's guilt - and the guilt of 
his gangsters - must not be left open for future debate. The whole nau­
seating matter should be spread out on a permanent record under oath 
by witnesses and with all the written documents ... In short, there must 
never be any question anywhere by anyone about who was responsible 
for the war and for the uncivilized war crimes.20 
Similar sentiments were echoed by members of Congress and the 
American Chief IMT Prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert 
Jackson who declared: 
Unless we write the record of this movement with clarity and precision, 
we cannot blame the future if in days of peace it finds incredible the ac­
cusatory generalities uttered during the war. We must establish incredi­
ble events by credible evidence.21 
There were other reasons as well for the Allied desire that 
Nuremberg document the history of the Nazi Reich. Generals 
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton all witnessed firsthand the horrors of 
the Nazi concentration camps. They ordered their troops to visit the 
camps and directed that German civilians be compelled to go as well. 
They believed there should be as many witnesses as possible to the re­
ality of the Nazis' crimes. The big picture of Nazi criminality was also 
needed to help establish a predicate to punish not only the Nazi hier­
archy, but the tens of thousands of Hitler's followers who also commit-
19. H.L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 
(1947), quoted in 1 DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A 
PROSECUTOR'S COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 31 (1999). 
20. SAMUEL L. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 518-19 (1952), quoted in 
WILLIAM J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG 25 (1970). 
21. Report from Robert Jackson to Harry S. Truman (June 7, 1945), quoted in TAYLOR, 
supra note 14, at 54. 
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ted serious crimes. A stirring and complete record might serve as a 
substitute for painstaking fact-finding in each case. Such a record 
could also serve a number of political goals, including homefront 
justification of the costly war effort and encouragement of 
Soviet/American cooperation in the tense post-war period. 
Pursuing the full historical story while at the same time prosecuting 
individual criminals is an immensely costly, time-consuming, and diffi­
cult task. It requires the tracing of a whole regime's plans, intentions, 
and actions as well as those of the accused in the dock. Focusing on 
the words and deeds of the defendants alone will not do. In the Nazis' 
case, this meant that the life of Adolf Hitler became a central part of 
the trial, as did the activities of the Gestapo, Foreign Ministry, 
Wehrmacht and a host of other government entities. 
The conditions at Nuremberg were uniquely well suited to the 
preparation and presentation of an enormous didactic case.22 Almost 
every top Nazi official still living was available for interrogation and 
prosecution. Both because of the Nazis' own predilections and the 
completeness of the Allied victory, the triumphant governments were 
in possession of an unprecedented collection of meticulous records 
presenting, in the Nazis' own words, the nature and scope of their 
crimes. This treasure trove was augmented by a host of films and pho­
tographs, making possible a graphic presentation of Nazi atrocities. 
Because the Germans had unconditionally surrendered, there was no 
government in place to resist anything the Allies chose to do at 
Nuremberg. Germany was under firm Allied military control, with no 
room left for the sort of organized resistance that arose in Germany at 
the time of the Leipzig trials or in Turkey when the British sought the 
prosecution of those who massacred the Armenians. The United 
States, the most powerful and wealthy country in the world, commit­
ted itself fully to the Nuremberg prosecution. America made virtually 
unlimited resources available for the scouring of records, preparation 
of films, interrogation of witnesses and presentation of a vast historical 
case. Both the American and British trial teams were staffed with 
gifted advocates, beginning with the enormously eloquent and ener­
getic Justice Robert Jackson. Finally, there was no effective defense 
bar in place to resist the puissant prosecutorial teams. The German 
lawyers asked to represent the defendants had virtually no resources 
and had, themselves, just lived through twelve years of numbing Nazi 
tyranny. 
To pursue the two goals yoked together at Nuremberg, the prose­
cuting governments agreed to use an essentially adversarial process 
that relied on the parties to generate the evidence and conduct the 
22. For a description of the background to, and operation of, the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
see TAYLOR, supra note 14. The following assessment of Nuremberg is based, primarily on 
Taylor's outstanding work. 
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proceedings. This approach served the victors well, allowing the 
American government to use its vast resources to prepare the prosecu­
tion case while leaving the defendants more or less on their own. The 
defendants were forced to do double duty as individuals accused of 
specific crimes and as representatives of an evil regime deserving of 
condemnation. The trial shifted from a focus on personal responsibil­
ity to a recitation of enormous and organized criminality. It grew into 
a mammoth nine-month undertaking that generated more than forty­
two volumes of evidence and a series of stunning film presentations. 
To make its lasting historical record, the Nuremberg prosecution fo­
cused not on witnesses but on Nazi documents, a virtually unimpeach­
able source. Traditional rules of evidence and procedure were aban­
doned so that the complex story could be told unimpeded by 
traditional constraints regarding relevance, hearsay, and authentica­
tion. 
Nuremberg is the seminal event in post-World War II international 
criminal justice. It is the precedent upon which all ensuing develop­
ments are based. In large measure, this is due to the widely shared 
perception that Nuremberg worked. The Nazis convicted at 
Nuremberg clearly deserved condemnation and the didactic record the 
Allies produced has withstood the test of time. This has led more re­
cent prosecutors and legislators to see Nuremberg as an appropriate 
model for emulation. Nuremberg's success bolstered the belief that 
vast narratives of governmental bestiality can be presented in sprawl­
ing trials, with the interests of individual criminal defendants properly 
respected. In Nuremberg's wake, it has become acceptable to assume 
that both didactic and individual goals can be met in the same pro­
ceeding. 
What may not be clear from a cursory look at Nuremberg is that it 
succeeded because of the incredibly advantageous conditions in which 
the trial was held, and due to the outstanding fairness and care of the 
judges, most particularly the IMT's President, Sir Geoffrey Lawrence. 
Many of the safeguards that ensure the integrity of adversary pro­
ceedings were abandoned at Nuremberg. The defendants were pro­
vided inexperienced and underfunded counsel. The protections af­
forded by a host of evidence rules were put aside. There was no 
arrangement for appellate review and there was intense pressure for a 
speedy resolution of the case. The main targets of the prosecution 
were not the defendants, but rather such monsters as Hitler, Himmler 
and Goebbels. The men in the dock were, frequently, little more than 
stand-ins. It is truly remarkable that the Nuremberg trial succeeded in 
doing and appearing to do justice, rather than getting sidetracked by 
prejudice and the temptation to treat the accused as fall guys. The 
Tribunal displayed a nuanced appreciation of the individual defen­
dants' positions when it acquitted three of them and sentenced a num­
ber of others relatively leniently. Despite the Soviet view that indict-
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ment was tantamount to conviction and that conviction always war­
ranted death, the Tribunal majority differentiated and showed careful 
judgment. 
Several other aspects of the work of the IMT are worth noting. 
The didactic case prepared and presented, in large measure, by the 
American prosecutors was not primarily focused on the Holocaust. 
Rather, it conceived of military aggression as the Nazis' chief crime. 
The Americans worked to show unlawful aggression by producing 
thousands of German government documents - so many in fact that 
Lord Justice Lawrence eventually imposed limitations to ensure that 
the Tribunal and defense would not be overwhelmed. At that mo­
ment, the Americans, sensing a loss of momentum and credibility, 
turned from their documentary tale of aggression to proof of atrocity 
and, inadvertently, the Holocaust. This "new" evidence, most par­
ticularly a film entitled Nazi Concentration Camps, was riveting, re­
stored prosecutorial momentum, and regained the moral high ground 
for the prosecution. The Americans would return to atrocity evidence 
to revive flagging fortunes several more times while the French and 
Soviet prosecution teams would make such matters the core issue of 
their cases. Nuremberg displayed to the world and prosecutors just 
how affecting and persuasive Holocaust evidence could be and 
thereby bound future trials to such materials. In presenting an enor­
mous and horror-filled case, Nuremberg raised the stakes of interna­
tional criminal prosecutions. Any failure at Nuremberg would have 
been perceived as a devastating blow, discrediting the Allies' view of 
history and their claims of Nazi barbarity. The two-track approach re­
sulted in a high-stakes gamble. 
D. Eichmann 
Nuremberg was the bedrock upon which was built the next great 
international23 criminal prosecution - the 1960 trial before an Israeli 
court of the Nazi architect of the Western European Holocaust, Adolf 
Eichmann.24 Nuremberg served as precedent that Israel's prosecutor, 
Gideon Hausner, viewed as essential. He stated that in preparation for 
the trial he "consumed [the forty-two-volume record of Nuremberg] at 
the rate of a volume per day."25 The whole Nuremberg record was 
eventually placed in evidence at Eichmann's trial. 
23. "International" is here used in the sense of a trial taking place in one nation but con­
sidering events in another. 
24. For a description of how Eichmann was kidnapped from Argentina and brought be­
fore the court in Jerusalem, see ISSER HAREL, THE HOUSE ON GARIBALDI STREET (1975). 
25. GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 290 (1966). Unless otherwise noted, my 
analysis of the Eichmann case will be based on the factual material set forth in Hausner's 
work. 
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Like Nuremberg, Eichmann was conceived not simply as a criminal 
prosecution but as an opportunity for a didactic proceeding - one 
that could present the entire story of the Jewish Holocaust, which 
Nuremberg itself only incompletely addressed. David Ben Gurion, the 
Israeli Prime Minister, in a letter to the World Zionist Organization, 
wrote: 
The Holocaust that the Nazis wreaked on the Jewish people is not like 
other atrocities that the Nazis committed in the world, but a unique epi­
sode that has no equal, an attempt to totally destroy the Jewish people, 
which Hitler and his helpers did not dare try with any other nation. It is 
the particular duty of the State of Israel, the Jewish people's only sover­
eign entity, to recount this episode in its full magnitude and horror; with­
out ignoring the Nazi regime's other crimes against humanity - but not 
as one of these crimes, rather as the only crime that has no parallel in 
human history.26 
Hausner shared these views and wrote in his book on the case: 
There was, in fact, much more to it than a desire for a complete record. I 
wanted our people at home to know as many of the facts of the great dis­
aster as could be legitimately conveyed through these proceedings. It was 
imperative for the stability of our youth that they should learn the full 
truth of what had happened, for only through knowledge could under­
standing and reconciliation with the past be achieved. Our younger gen­
eration, absorbed as it was in the building and guarding of the new state, 
had far too little insight into events which ought to be a pivotal point in 
its education. The teenagers of Israel, most of them born into statehood 
or during the struggle for it, had no real knowledge, and therefore no ap­
preciation, of the way in which their own flesh and blood had perished. 
There was here a breach between the generations, a possible source of an 
abhorrence of the nation's yesterday. This could be removed only by fac­
tual enlightenment.27 
By committing the Eichmann prosecution to telling the full story of 
the Jewish Holocaust, the Israelis embraced the two-track strategy of 
Nuremberg and expanded its reach by focusing on a lower level (al­
though still significant) official brought to trial long after the war 
ended. The Israelis' motivations included a desire to challenge the im­
pression that Europe's Jews had gone meekly to their slaughter. To 
this end, the prosecution sought to emphasize the heroism of the 
Jewish victims. Rachel Auerbach of Yad Vashem (the official 
Holocaust memorial institution of Israel) served as an adviser to the 
prosecution team. She outlined the sorts of witnesses who ought to be 
called including, most particularly, those who could describe "deeds of 
26. Quoted in TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION 329-30 (Haim Watzman trans., 
1993). 
27. HAUSNER, supra note 25, at 291-92. 
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self-sacrifice, resistance, rebellion, revenge, and flight." 28 Auerbach's 
approach was adopted. 
Although the Eichmann prosecution did not have all the advan­
tages that the Allies had at Nuremberg, the Israelis still found them­
selves in a situation that might facilitate a big didactic trial. The defen­
dant, while not a leading Nazi, was a significant functionary in the 
ministry that had arranged the deaths of millions of Jews. He was a 
criminal of the sort who, doubtless, warranted the most severe pun­
ishment. Eichmann's work had generated a vast body of incriminating 
evidence. There was no doubt about his identity or his guilt. Docu­
ments and witnesses were available in abundance to prove his connec­
tion to murderous operations on an unimaginable scale. Moreover, 
Eichmann, like his more illustrious Nuremberg Nazi brethren, was a 
man with no real political protectors. He was not being tried on his 
home turf and lacked connections with any nation willing to act on his 
behalf or protect the ideas with which he was associated. He faced 
prosecution by a modern nation-state with relatively large resources 
available to prepare its case. Eventually, Eichmann would be de­
fended by one of the same lawyers, Dr. Robert Servatius, who handled 
the cases of a number of Nuremberg defendants. Servatius had ab­
sorbed the quiescent and cooperative style of other Nuremberg de­
fense counsel. He did not set out to challenge the Holocaust or dis­
credit its victims. Moreover, he was a continental lawyer unschooled in 
the adversarial art of cross-examination. 
Eichmann's trial conformed to the Nuremberg pattern. It relied on 
precisely the same sort of adversarial approach utilized by the Allies in 
1945. The Israeli trial court heard evidence that ranged over the en­
tirety of the Holocaust, from early anti-Semitic activities like the 
Nuremberg race laws and Kristallnacht, to the murderous mass kill­
ings in the East by the mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen) and the 
operations of the death camps at Auschwitz, Sobibor, Treblinka and 
the rest. The prosecution incorporated this, and a great deal more, in 
its vast fifteen count indictment, diligently pursuing two tracks. The 
first focused on Eichmann. The second encompassed an enormous 
flood of Holocaust materials that had nothing to do with the defen­
dant in the protective glass booth. Weeks were spent on the 
Einsatzgruppen and Operation Reinhard (the organized murder of 
Poland's Jews). Eichmann was not demonstrably connected to either 
of these criminal activities. Still, the prosecution plowed on. In the 
end, for one middle rank Nazi official, there were 1400 documentary 
exhibits (some of them stretching to many thousands of pages), 121 
prosecution witnesses and ten months of hearings. The witnesses were 
a new addition to the two-track didactic criminal prosecution. At 
28. SEGEV, supra note 26, at 339. 
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Nuremberg, prosecutors called only thirty-three live witnesses. The 
Eichmann court adopted a virtually identical approach to evidentiary 
questions as had its forebear. Relevance restrictions were few; hearsay 
flooded in; and authentication requirements were loosened. 
As had been the case at Nuremberg, the Jerusalem trial generally 
came to be viewed as a legitimate exercise of legal authority, as well as 
the producer of a compelling narrative about the Holocaust. Again, 
however, a dangerously expanded and vulnerable process was saved 
from potential problems by the intervention of a particularly vigorous 
and fair-minded judge, Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau, who 
worked tirelessly to keep the proceedings on track. That his achieve­
ment was both difficult and significant is suggested by the abject fail­
ure of one of his colleagues on the Eichmann bench, Benjamin Halevi, 
to manage effectively an earlier Holocaust-related matter involving a 
libel accusation regarding a former Hungarian Jewish official. 29 Part of 
the reason for Landau's sedulous care may have been the fact that 
Eichmann had been illegally kidnapped from his hideout in Argentina 
by Israeli intelligence agents and, at the beginning of the case, the 
world community was highly critical of Israel's action. For whatever 
reason, Landau vigorously policed the proceeding, managing to keep 
it from tilting into damaging excess. At the end of the case, the judges, 
led by Landau, drafted a judgment that refused to treat Eichmann as 
the superhuman monster the prosecution had sought to depict and 
weighed the evidence presented in an evenhanded and persuasive 
manner. 
The Eichmann case did more than simply mirror Nuremberg. It 
redefined the focus of such cases and incorporated a broader array of 
evidence (most particularly that from victim witnesses). The atrocity 
materials that had inadvertently become so important at Nuremberg 
were the conscious heart and soul of the proceedings in Jerusalem. 
The Holocaust's evidentiary power was grasped and used not simply 
to resolve prosecutorial trial problems, but as the raison d'etre of the 
case. To prove the Holocaust, the Nuremberg documents and films 
were augmented with the testimony of scores of witnesses. These wit­
nesses presented a number of problems. Some were so emotionally or 
psychologically damaged as to prove incapable of testifying compe­
tently. One fainted on the witness stand and could not continue.30 An­
other was assailed by health problems before testifying and failed to 
respond to court directions once on the witness stand.31 Some wit­
nesses appeared to use the process to attempt to strike questionable 
29. See DOUGLAS, p. 156. 
30. 3 THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN - RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1237 (Eng. 
Trans. 1993) (hereinafter EICHMANN RECORD] (testimony of Y ehiel Dinur ). 
31. 1 EICHMANN RECORD, supra note 30, at 499, 517-18 (testimony of Rivka Yoselew­
ska). 
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blows at Eichmann.32 Others seemed out to advance their political ca­
reers33 or literary ambitions.34 All faced difficulties related to the, at 
least, fifteen year hiatus from the time of the Holocaust to the begin­
ning of the trial. 
The Eichmann prosecution's vast two-track approach had a dis­
torting effect on the trial. At least one third of the proof (all that con­
cerning the Einsatzgruppen, Operation Reinhard in Poland, the op­
eration of specific concentration camps and the rise of pre-war 
German anti-Semitism) had nothing to do with Eichmann at all. This 
meant that something like 40 of the 121 prosecution witnesses were 
literally irrelevant to the case against the defendant. When documen­
tary evidence, films, and photographs are considered, perhaps as much 
as half the prosecution's case was irrelevant. Not only was much of the 
proof irrelevant, the prosecution's conception of Eichmann was in­
flammatory and distorted. The prosecution chose to argue that 
Eichmann was second only to Hitler in responsibility for the 
Holocaust. This claim was patently ridiculous. Eichmann had been a 
mid-level functionary. Ranged above him were the great monsters of 
the Third Reich including Himmler, Heydrich, Bormann, Frank, Hoss 
and the rest. Eichmann was a murderous bureaucrat, not a blood­
spattered monster.35 
The stakes the Israelis risked in trying Eichmann in the manner 
they did were enormous. By abducting the defendant from Argentina, 
Israel had challenged the world political order. If Eichmann were ex­
onerated, or Israel shown to be a lawless state willing to indulge in a 
fraudulent show trial, the consequence would have been international 
ostracism. Moreover, if Eichmann were not persuasively proven guilty, 
the entire Israeli effort to have the Holocaust taken more seriously, 
both at home and abroad, would have been profoundly damaged. 
Mounting this enormous two-track prosecution meant risk of the most 
substantial sort, as well as enormous financial expense. 
32. 1 EICHMANN RECORD, supra note 30, at 455-66 (testimony of Abba Kovner sprin­
kled with improbable and emotion-laden material aimed at damning Eichmann). 
33. 3 EICHMANN RECORD, supra note 30, at 1123-27 (testimony of Zvi Zimmerman, a 
member of Parliament, found to have virtually no relevance to the case). 
34. 2 EICHMANN RECORD, supra note 30, at 709 (testimony of American judge Michael 
Musmanno described by defense counsel as "a publicist traveling from place to place gath­
ering material with a view to publication"). 
35. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM - A REPORT ON THE 
BANALITY OF EVIL (1963). Arendt's account of the Eichmann trial, however, has come un­
der serious criticism. See JACOB ROBINSON, AND THE CROOKED SHALL BE MADE 
STRAIGHT (1965). 
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E. Demjanjuk 
The Nuremberg two-track approach was not abandoned after 
Eichmann. Rather, it was refined and expanded upon when Israel re­
turned to the question of Holocaust criminality in the trial of John 
Demjanjuk in 1987.36 Demjanjuk was accused of having been Ivan 
"Grozny,"37 the particularly vicious operator of the gas chamber appa­
ratus at the Treblinka death camp in Poland during the Second World 
War. After lengthy denaturalization and extradition proceedings in 
the United States (where Demjanjuk had been living for many years), 
the defendant was extradited to Israel for trial. Both the United States 
and Israel appeared hopeful that Demjanjuk's prosecution and convic­
tion would usher in a new era in which Nazi murderers would finally 
(more than thirty-five years after the end of World War II) be pun­
ished for their crimes.38 This increased desire to see Holocaust crimi­
nals punished was a reflection of changing attitudes in both the United 
States and Israel.39 The attractiveness of prosecution was enhanced by 
the fact that the passage of time was rapidly thinning the ranks of 
Holocaust survivors who could identify criminals and provide live tes­
timony at their trials. As Michael Shaked, one of the Israeli prosecu­
tors, declared in his opening remarks: 
There can be no doubt, this may be one of the last trials where it is possi­
ble to bring to the stand witnesses who can say, "We were there, we saw 
what happened with our own eyes. We can testify as to what hap­
pened."40 
The Demjanjuk prosecution was also, at least in part, motivated by an 
Israeli desire to distract attention from the Palestinian Intifada then 
raging, by re-presenting the story of the Jews' suffering at the hands of 
the Nazis. With all this in mind, it is not hard to see why the two-track 
grand narrative approach pioneered at Nuremberg and refined in 
Eichmann was again deployed. 
Unfortunately, Demjanjuk was not the sort of case that could eas­
ily support such an approach. Ivan the Terrible, whoever he was, was 
not a major figure in, or architect of, the Holocaust. He was simply 
one of its bestial foot soldiers. In contrast to prior cases, the 
Demjanjuk pretrial investigative work was slipshod and incomplete -
emblematic of the case's start as a relatively minor matter. The victim 
witnesses who were relied upon for identifications had been handled 
36. Unless otherwise noted, my analysis of the Demjanjuk case will be based on the fac-
tual material set forth in TOM TEICHOLZ, THE TRIAL OF IV AN THE TERRIBLE (1990). 
37. "Grozny" translates into English as "Ivan the Terrible." Id. 
38. See DEMJANJUK V. PETROVSKY, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 146-47 (1993). 
39. See ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS (1984). 
40. Quoted in TEICHOLZ, supra note 36, at 103. 
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in a careless manner (particularly with respect to suggestive photo ar­
rays) that substantially increased the risk of erroneous identification.41 
The American prosecutors, who conducted much. of the preliminary 
investigation (in support of their denaturalization effort), employed a 
narrowly focused "hardball" approach to the proof that deprived the 
defense of critical information and lent a misleading air of certainty to 
the case.42• There were no document troves from which to cull damn­
ing evidence. In fact, there was only one document that directly con� 
nected Demjanjuk with the death camps, the Trawniki camp identity 
card. This card did not even tie Demjanjuk to Treblinka but rather to 
a different death camp, Sobibor. That Demjanjuk was not tried until 
more than 40 years after the end of World War II only added to the 
difficulty. This meant that memories had likely faded and all available 
witnesses were likely exposed to a variety of suggestive experiences, 
including testimony at prior trials, exposure to media reports, partici­
pation in various memorial activities, as well as tainted investigative 
efforts. Finally, the quiescent defense counsel who had generally been 
in charge at Nuremberg and during Eichmann's case had been re­
placed by aggressive, publicity hungry American and Israeli advocates 
well versed in adversarial techniques, if not the evidence in the 
Demjanjuk case. The cooperative spirit with which the earlier trials 
had been managed no longer existed. Instead, a resounding clash be­
tween prosecution and defense could be expected. 
The special three-judge Israeli court that tried Demjanjuk followed 
in the footsteps of its two-track predecessors. The adversarial burden 
to produce evidence was placed squarely on the shoulders of the par­
ties. The prosecution sought, once again, to present a narrative of the 
Holocaust. To this end, it used materials presented at previous trials, 
elaborate expert analyses and a great deal of victim witness testimony. 
The prosecutors went about their job with the utmost zeal. They cast 
Demjanjuk in the role of villainous mass murderer. In their zeal, they 
seemed to ignore the possibility that Demjanjuk was not Ivan the 
Terrible. The court used the same loose approach to evidence that had 
been adopted in Nuremberg and Eichmann. Relevance was ignored, 
hearsay embraced and authentication requirements abandoned. Even 
cautionary rules designed to ensure the integrity of eyewitness identi­
fications were disregarded. The court, as a matter of principle, 
adopted the view that the victim witnesses had suffered so deep a 
trauma that it was impossible for them to forget their experiences or 
the identity of their tormentors. 
41. See WILLEM A. WAGENAAR, IDENTIFYING IVAN: A CASE STUDY IN LEGAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (1988). 
42. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F. 3d 338 (1993). 
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The resulting trial was a sprawling and contentious affair that ran 
for more than a year. Unfortunately, there was no great judge to guide 
and protect the proceedings. The pedestrian panel hearing the case 
placed excessive reliance on the victim witnesses and was eventually 
shown to have misbehaved in its relations with the press. Despite sev­
eral warning signals, the court wholeheartedly embraced the proof 
suggesting that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible and dismissed out of 
hand anything pointing in the other direction. The prosecution's zeal 
knew no bounds. Prosecutors seized virtually every available opportu­
nity to strike blows at both the defendant and his counsel - including 
the incendiary accusation that the defense and some of its witnesses 
were associated with Holocaust denial groups. The prosecutors 
painted the defendant as a monster of the most profound depravity. 
No opportunity to attack his character was missed. 
Demjanjuk's defense team, particularly its two American mem­
bers, was simply inadequate to the task of representing the target of so 
vast and controversial a case. Their interrogation of victim witnesses 
was insensitive and infuriated both onlookers and the court. The ex­
perts they called were, for the most part, shown to be charlatans or in­
competents. They dismissed evidentiary sources (particularly those 
from behind the Iron Curtain) that would eventually prove critical to 
the case. They were so distracted by the media coverage of the trial 
that they often lost sight of their client's best interests. As the trial 
progressed, the pressures of the case, and their lack of adequate skill 
and preparation, led Demjanjuk's American lawyers to veer toward 
simplistic claims tinged with Holocaust denial. When the trial eventu­
ally spun out of control, the Demjanjuk family decided to fire the 
American lawyers and place their full reliance on Y oram Sheftel, the 
sole Israeli advocate on the team. Sheftel, while clearly more compe­
tent, was not particularly effective. He was so combative that he even­
tually came to be viewed as perhaps the most hated man in Israel.43 
While the defense team's weaknesses caused much of its difficulty, the 
pressures generated in resisting a two-track didactic prosecution are 
likely to push even the best of defenders into denial of historical facts 
and victim denigration. 
The result of all this was a travesty of justice. The court convicted 
Demjanjuk and wrote an opinion it declared to be a tribute to the vic­
tims of the Holocaust, "a monument to their souls, to the holy congre­
gations that were lost and are no more, to those who were annihi­
lated. "44 All doubts and questions were summarily swept aside in the 
fervor to pay homage. 
43. See YORAM SHEFTEL, DEFENDING IVAN THE TERRIBLE (1996). 
44. THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL 39 (Asher Felix Landau ed., 1991). 
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Demjanjuk appealed his conviction and as the case ground slowly 
ahead, evidence raising the most serious questions about the accuracy 
of the decision began to surface. Witnesses came forward to say that 
Ivan the Terrible was really a man named Marchenko. Others pre­
sented proof that Demjanjuk had been stationed at Sobibor and a 
number of other camps, but never at Treblinka. Information became 
available that the identifications relied upon by the Jerusalem District 
Court were tainted and might be erroneous. Eventually, the Supreme 
Court of Israel declared that the conviction was unsound, had to be 
reversed, and Demjanjuk freed. There was a public outcry in Israel 
because a man shown to have been a camp guard was being released, 
however, the lack of clear proof and the appearance of judicial blun­
der seemed to foreclose any other choice. The failure of the Demjan­
juk prosecution struck a fatal blow to Holocaust prosecutions in Israel 
- there would be no more. The stakes had been raised so high that 
there was no way to go on once the Demjanjuk effort was discredited. 
The miscarriage of justice produced by too light a regard for basic 
safeguards about evidence and identifications had destroyed the le­
gitimacy of the prosecutorial effort. 
Despite the Demjanjuk disaster, the two-track didactic case model 
invented at Nuremberg has not been abandoned. It was used with dis­
astrous consequences in the Canadian trial and acquittal of Imre Fin ta, 
a Hungarian Gendarme Captain allegedly responsible for the loading 
of Jews onto trains bound for the extermination camps.45 Far more se­
riously, it has been used as the model for the early prosecutions 
mounted by the ICTY and ICTR. The first full-scale trial at the ICTY, 
that of Dusko Tactic, was marked by a strikingly similar approach.46 
The trial in that case dragged on for more than a year, focused more 
on Serb policy than on the defendant, utilized exceedingly lax rules of 
evidence and eventually faced extremely serious witness problems, in­
cluding the demonstrated perjury of a witness introduced into the pro­
ceedings through the machinations of the Bosnian Muslim govern­
ment. While Tactic was properly convicted, the process used holds 
little promise of becoming an effective and reliable prosecutorial 
mechanism. There were similar difficulties in the ICTR trial of Jean­
Paul Akayasu.47 Even the Rome treaty outlining the nature of the In­
ternational Criminal Court seems to contemplate a Nuremberg-like 
process with didactic trials, loose evidence rules, and robustly adver-
45. R. v. lmre Finta, 1994 S.C.R. 265 (Can.). 
46. My discussion of the Tadic case is based upon MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN 
JUSTICE (1997). 
47. See Judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998 Interna­
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), available at http://222.un.org/ictr/english/judgments/ 
akayesu.html. 
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sarial procedures.48 Nuremberg was a powerful and positive precedent 
in international law. It has, however, had a decidedly negative impact 
on international criminal procedure, inhibiting development of a more 
effective, efficient and careful sort of courtroom process. Such an ap­
proach heightens not only the risk of failure but also the cost of fail­
ure. Even success can come with a prohibitively high price tag. 
II. BASS, DOUGLAS, GOLDSTONE AND ROBERTSON 
A. Bass 
Gary Bass has written a first rate scholarly volume about when and 
why international tribunals are likely to succeed. At the heart of his 
book are five case studies including both successful and failed prosecu­
torial efforts. Among the former are Nuremberg and the ICTY, while 
the latter include international efforts to deal with Napoleon, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, and the Turkish leaders responsible for the Armenian 
massacres. These nuanced and detailed historical studies forcefully 
remind the reader of the point made by George Santayana that 
"[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."49 
Bass helps us remember this particular and important past, thereby in­
creasing the likelihood that we may learn from it in pursuing interna­
tional justice in the future. 
Bass argues that liberal states are not always likely to support in­
ternational tribunals. They will sometimes, however, be willing to do 
so. Understanding when is key to assessing the likelihood of a tribu­
nal's success. On the basis of his five case studies, Bass concludes that 
prosecution is most likely to work if three critical conditions are met. 
His first and second conditions emphasize the "selfish" concerns of 
potential prosecutors about the welfare of their own citizens. If resis­
tance to arrests or trials is likely to lead to a significant risk that sol­
diers or civilians of the prosecuting nations will be injured, then the 
prospects for trial are dramatically reduced. Conversely, if the crimes 
charged arise out of the infliction of serious harm on soldiers or civil­
ians of the prosecuting nations then the chances for trial are substan­
tially enhanced. Bass's third point is that prosecution is often tied to 
political sentiment in the prosecuting nations. If a wide segment of the 
populace shares a sense of outrage about an alleged crime, prosecu­
tion is far more likely. While none of these points is meant to be an 
ironclad rule, together they have substantial explanatory power with 
respect to Bass's case studies. Prosecution failed in Turkey and was 
placed in serious jeopardy at the ICTY because the Western democra-
48. See Leila Madya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: 
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381 (2000). 
49. See SANTAYANA, supra note *. 
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cies faced risks to their own troops and citizens in making arrests and 
conducting trials. The prospects for prosecution were boosted at 
Nuremberg because there were no such risks, and because the Nazis 
had committed heinous acts that affected the citizens of all the nations 
involved in the IMT. 
Stay the Hand of Vengeance is strongest on the historical back­
ground to the trials and trial efforts examined. The book is full of in­
teresting and illuminating insights about the politics that surrounded 
each case. Bass presents a great deal of little known information about 
the .treatment of the defeated Napoleon - especially about the pro­
tective role played by the Duke of Wellington with respect to his de­
feated adversary. Perhaps the strongest and saddest section of the 
book considers the failed prosecution of the perpetrators of the 
Armenian genocide. The consequences of that failure reverberate to 
this day. Bass traverses more familiar ground with respect to 
Nuremberg and the ICTY but still uncovers valuable information. 
About Nuremberg, Bass informs us that its key American sponsor, 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, was not only motivated by 
his sense of fair play in insisting upon trials but by a "genteel 
antisemit[ism]" (p. 174) that led him to oppose the draconian propos­
als of the Jewish Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. With re­
spect to the ICTY, Bass reminds us that its creation was an admission 
of Western failure to stop a clearly identified human rights catastro­
phe, and that it was saved from ignominious failure, in good measure, 
by the courageous and skillful efforts of several American diplomats 
including most particularly "the mother of all tribunals," (p. 262) 
Madeleine Albright. 
Bass's book does not assign itself the task of looking closely at the 
trials that were the results of consummated international agreements 
to prosecute. His position seems to be that such trials can be very im­
portant because they may "help bring out the truth" (p. 144). He does 
not address the problems inherent in such trials when they become 
lengthy recitations of general history. He does, however, note the par­
ticular problems raised by the prosecution of Dusko Tadic in the 
ICTY, a case that focused on an insignificant defendant of no real im­
portance in the Balkans drama. Bass remarks on the incredible slow­
ness of that trial, its reliance on marginal evidence, and the prosecu­
tors' need to abandon certain charges and renounce the testimony of 
certain witnesses. 
B. Douglas 
Lawrence Douglas in The Memory of Judgment, does concern him­
self with an examination of the details of several international criminal 
prosecutions. His book, like Bass's, is anchored in a series of powerful 
and well-researched case studies including the Nuremberg trial, as well 
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as those of Adolf Eichmann and John Demjanjuk.50 Douglas's objec­
tive is to examine whether trials, most particularly those involving the 
events of the Holocaust, can serve more than just the "juridical" 
(p. 174) goal of proving the guilt or innocence of an accused defen­
dant. Douglas asks whether the didactic two-track trial born at Nur­
emberg can serve a number of grander social objectives including the 
creation of a lasting historical record, the achievement of "collective 
catharsis" (p. 1 10), and the establishment of "heroic memory" 
(p. 154). He takes the position that trials about the Holocaust have 
successfully served all these ends and rejects the notion that trials 
should be strictly juridical. 
Douglas begins his work with a careful analysis of the background 
to, and proof used at, the Nuremberg trial. He pays particular atten­
tion to the American prosecution film, Nazi Concentration Camps. 
Douglas, however, reminds us that Nuremberg did not start as a 
Holocaust or atrocity case but, instead, was conceived primarily as an 
effort to punish Nazi militarism and crimes against peace. As a result 
the main evidentiary focus (at least by the Americans) was Nazi ag­
gression rather than the plight of the victims of atrocities. To serve 
that end, the American team sought to present a huge array of Nazi 
documents while relegating live witnesses (most particularly victims) 
to a far inferior position. Douglas stresses the transformative impact of 
Nazi Concentration Camps and other atrocity evidence. He nicely 
demonstrates the dramatic shift in focus as displayed in the closing ar­
gument of the chief British prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross. Instead 
of pursuing the earlier themes of the British case, Shawcross concen­
trated on a heart-rending affidavit written by Hermann Grabe de­
scribing the slaughter of innocent Jewish men, women, and children by 
a Nazi death squad. Douglas says of this speech: "It was as if the 
prosecution itself had finally absorbed the significance of its own ter­
rible evidence and, in so doing, had come to recognize the insufficien­
cies of the legal case meant to contain it" (p. 93) . Douglas argues that 
the experience of the Nuremberg trial reoriented international prose­
cution and infused it with a concern to remember and memorialize the 
Holocaust. 
The Memory of Judgment presents this transformation as an ap­
propriate one that eventually resulted in the Eichmann prosecution 
where Holocaust memorialization moved to the acknowledged center 
of the trial. The didactic elements of the case were recognized and 
embraced by an extremely zealous Israeli prosecution team and sub­
stantially strengthened by the use of 121 live witnesses - most of 
them Holocaust survivors. The goal was not simply to convict 
Eichmann but to address the terrible trauma caused by the Holocaust 
50. Douglas also focuses on the Canadian trial of a Holocaust denier named Ernst 
Zundel. Pp. 212-13. 
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and rehabilitate the reputation of its victims. This project clashed with 
traditional notions of relevance and led to sharp clashes between the 
court {which sought traditional juridical goals) and the prosecution 
{which labored mightily to tell the whole Holocaust story). Douglas 
finds that the efforts of court and prosecution balanced each other and 
resulted in a case that was both effective in convicting Eichmann and 
capable of addressing the Holocaust, in other words, a trial record that 
could "condemn the accused and . . .  acquit his victims" (p. 154). It was 
also a record that could kindle interest in Holocaust prosecutions 
around the world. 
This well-reasoned'and thoughtful analysis of the Eichmann case is 
far from uncontroversial. As early as the time of the trial itself, power­
fully intelligent critics like Telford Taylor and Hannah Arendt were 
sharply critical of Israel's approach. Arendt in particular was disturbed 
by Israel's adoption of the two-track approach, viewing it as a betrayal 
of the juridical mission. While Douglas presents forceful counters to 
Arendt's arguments, one cannot help but recall that Eichmann set the 
pattern that would result in the Demjanjuk debacle. Douglas seeks to 
address Demjanjuk by suggesting that the court took the didactic ef­
fort too far. It is hard to see how such a problem can be avoided ex­
cept by extraordinarily sensitive and fairminded judges. The risk of ju­
dicial bias and hazard of distraction {because of a parade of 
irrelevancies) are inherent in the two-track approach. Moreover, as 
Douglas points out, errors "in trials staged as didactic spectacles, ritu­
als of justice designed to place the institutions of criminal justice in the 
fore of the public's mind . . .  seem more consequential" {p. 206). In 
fact, Demjanjuk not only brought Israeli Holocaust prosecutions to an 
end but, Douglas suggests, may even have helped fuel Holocaust de­
nial since it is a short step from witness errors about Ivan the Terrible 
to witness mistakes about the Holocaust itself. 
Douglas goes on to look at other cases affected by Holocaust­
related issues. He particularly focuses on a Canadian case involving a 
Holocaust denier named Ernst Zundel (pp. 212-13). Even here, out­
side the realm of crimes committed during the Holocaust, the prob­
lems of the two-track didactic trial can be observed. The Canadian 
courts that considered the Zundel case were unsettled for years by the 
myriad of evidentiary problems generated. Although the Eichmann 
case may have been "an extraordinary success" (p. 260), in many ways, 
it was also an invitation to the development of courtroom processes 
and attitudes that became increasingly unmanageable, unpredictable, 
and unsatisfactory. The course that yielded the Demjanjuk disaster 
was charted in Eichmann. The law grows by experience and prece­
dent. Where Eichmann pointed, Demjanjuk and other cases followed, 
creating an ever more fragile, costly, and risky process. 
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C. Goldstone 
In 1994, Richard Goldstone was chosen to be chief prosecutor of 
the ICTY. He was selected after a great deal of political wrangling in 
circumstances that raised substantial doubts about whether interna­
tional prosecution in the Balkans could succeed. In significant part due 
to his efforts, the ICTY shifted from an aspirational entity with few 
cases to a serious instrument of justice. In his memoir, For Humanity, 
Goldstone describes the process leading to the ICTY's transformation 
and also provides a number of insights on the progress of democracy 
and justice in Goldstone's native South Africa. 
One of the things that Goldstone's memoir makes quite clear is the 
impact of the Nuremberg precedent on the formation of the ICTY and 
the thinking of its chief prosecutor. At the outset of his discussion of 
the ICTY, Goldstone notes "the importance of the legacy of the 
Nuremberg trials" (p. 75). He describes its holdings about jurisdiction 
and crimes against humanity as fundamental. He embraces 
Nuremberg's two-track approach most particularly with respect to the 
creation of a historical record in the courtroom. The connection be­
tween the ICTY and Nuremberg also comes through strongly when 
Goldstone discusses why a tribunal was created with respect to 
Yugoslavia but not in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. Judge 
Goldstone begins by pointing out that Yugoslavian ethnic cleansing 
reminded the Western community of the Holocaust, and that photos 
of the Bosnian prison camps were uncomfortably similar to those 
made infamous at Nuremberg. All of this - and the European loca­
tion of the Balkan atrocities - challenged the Western democracies 
on their home ground with a vile Nazi-style racism of the sort that had 
been condemned in 1945. The absence of these factors with respect to 
Iraq made it appear a far less appealing venue for the creation of a 
lasting historical record by means of an international tribunal. 
Goldstone's book is particularly illuminating regarding the difficul­
ties in getting an international prosecution under way. He identifies a 
number of problems that must be resolved. Perhaps foremost among 
these is the organizational effort required to build up a prosecutor's 
office. By Goldstone's estimate, such an effort takes at least 18 
months. Delay of the sort required to accomplish such a project erodes 
credibility and increases evidence-gathering problems. Evidence gath­
ering presents other difficulties as well. To effectively prosecute high­
ranking defendants, let alone present a grand historical narrative, re­
quires a significant supply of evidentiary information. To get that in­
formation requires international cooperation. In the case of the ICTY, 
Goldstone concluded that he needed a significant volume of informa­
tion from American and British intelligence sources. The CIA and 
others were loath to turn such information over and a protracted insti­
tutional battle with friendly governments ensued. The same sort of 
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problems arose with respect to the willingness of NATO forces to ar­
rest those indicted by the ICTY. It was only after extensive struggle 
and political shifts that any significant number of defendants was 
taken into custody. 
Goldstone highlights a number of other institutional problems as 
well. International prosecutions on a grand scale demand a grand 
budget. Securing such a budget is a politically daunting task. 
Goldstone describes in detail his budget battles with a United Nations 
("UN") bureaucracy that did not want to fund the prosecutorial effort 
adequately and sought to use funding as an instrument of control. The 
judges appointed to the ICTY also threatened prosecutorial inde­
pendence. Many of them were the products of inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial justice systems. In the former, courts often have the power 
to direct and manage prosecutorial operations. Despite the adversary 
nature of the rules of the ICTY, a number of judges sought to impose 
their views about the pace and scope of prosecution on Goldstone's 
office. The chief prosecutor's memoirs suggest just how political the 
commencement of international prosecution can be. Goldstone, 
schooled in the task of transitional justice by his experiences in South 
Africa, was up to the task of making the ICTY a real and functioning 
prosecutorial mechanism. He, however, needed a great deal of help. 
Among his allies were the American diplomats Madeleine Albright 
and David Scheffer. Goldstone left the ICTY to return to South 
Africa before the prosecutors in The Hague had mounted many cases. 
His memoirs provide valuable insights into the struggles and difficul­
ties of setting up an effective international justice mechanism. 
D. Robertson 
Geoffrey Robertson's book is an extended effort to chart the rise 
of crimes against humanity as a prosecutable offense. Unfortunately, it 
is not carefully grounded in history, and seems to have been written 
more as a polemic than as scholarly work. Both Bass and Douglas are 
painstakingly careful in assembling the facts upon which they base 
their case studies. Robertson eschews careful factual analysis and con­
sequently fails to build a solid foundation for his argument. As early as 
the Preface to his work, Robertson shows disregard for the need to 
support debatable propositions. In the Preface, Robertson indicates 
that it was the Holocaust that "called forth an international tribunal -
the court at Nuremberg" (p. xiv). This is not an absurd claim but it 
cries out for support of some sort. None is forthcoming. A careful look 
at the matter suggests that there were a number of other and stronger 
motives for Nuremberg's creation, including Roosevelt's and 
Stimson's concerns about revisionism, the strong American "legalistic-
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moralistic" mind set,51 Stalin's desire to destroy Nazi credibility, and a 
number of others. As to the impact of the Holocaust, so centrally­
placed a prosecutor as Telford Taylor has said that it was not until he 
was in the midst of the Nuremberg trial that he began to appreciate 
the "full scope of the Holocaust."52 Douglas documents the rising ap­
peal of atrocity evidence over the course of the Nuremberg trial. It 
was only as the trial neared its conclusion that the Holocaust moved 
toward center stage. It is simply not good writing or thinking to breez­
ily declare that Nuremberg was rooted in the Holocaust. 
Robertson's lack of care extends to factual claims of less exalted 
status as well. He states that the first (American) concentration camp 
film shown at Nuremberg was "newsreels of Auschwitz and Belsen" 
(p. 215). This description is wrong on several counts. The film was not 
"newsreels" but the creation of Hollywood director George Stevens, 
and it did not contain any footage showing Auschwitz.53 Similarly, 
Robertson unqualifiedly states that "crucial documents" (p. 240) pre­
sented at the Demjanjuk trial were forgeries (in context this can only 
be read as a reference to the Trawniki document). The parties at the 
Demjanjuk trial spent 8000 pages of transcript and more than 100 
court sessions on that question. There is no consensus on the point, 
though every American and Israeli court that ever ruled on the matter 
found the Trawniki card genuine.54 
Aside from documentation problems, Robertson's work is marred 
by a simplistic heroes-and-villains view of events. Non-governmental 
organizations ("NGOs") are virtually always on the side of the angels, 
while diplomats and politicians are almost always venal. That this is 
unfair to people like Madeleine Albright and David Scheffer, to name 
but two, is rather clear. Robertson is also prone to fits of hyperbole. 
He describes the Chilean dictator Augosto Pinochet as responsible for 
" [t]he century's most vicious human rights violation" (p. 41). Such a 
claim is simply absurd in light of the crimes of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and 
Pol Pot, to name but a few. This is not to suggest that Pinochet is an 
innocent, but rather that a more finely calibrated argument might have 
enhanced the credibility of Robertson's presentation. Given all of 
these flaws, it is hard to credit Robertson's work. Fair description and 
measured analysis are essential if we are to learn history's lessons. 
51. GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 95 (1951). 
52. TAYLOR, supra note 14, at xi. 
53. See DOUGLAS pp. 27-37 (providing a detailed description of the provenance and 
content of Nazi Concentration Camps). 
54. See TEICHOLZ, supra note 36, at 166-77, 251-56. 
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III. Two SUGGESTIONS 
About 25 years ago the great British historian, E.P. Thompson, 
wrote Whigs and Hunters,55 a book describing a war that raged in the 
forests and pastures of rural England in the 1710s and 1720s. That 
struggle was mounted by small landholders and forest dwellers . in an 
effort to protect their traditional rights in open or common land 
against the property claims of Whig patricians who sought to seize and 
enclose the land. The combatants were not well matched and the 
wealthy won a good deal more often than they lost. Yet they did not 
always win.56 Thompson, an avowed Marxist, began his study of this 
woodland confrontation convinced that he would find that the law was 
simply one more instrument by which the rich oppressed the poor. 
What he found, however, surprised him. Although the well heeled of­
ten succeeded, legal cases were not a sure thing for them and, in fact, 
the law grew in ways that progressively hemmed in the options of the 
powerful. Thompson, in the moving final chapter of his book, referred 
to this process as the growth of the rule of law and saw it as the in­
strumentality by which British society slowly and painfully grew to­
ward true democracy. He also saw it as the wellspring of both 
Gandhi's and Martin Luther King's power to overcome institutional 
injustice. 
One thing that is missing from Bass's and Douglas's otherwise ex­
cellent works is any theory of why international law appears to be 
growing into an ever more effective tool in punishing gross criminal 
disregard for human rights. For Bass, what seems to be posited as an 
explanation for recent developments is a convergence of factors that 
foster prosecution. When these are not present, legal action should not 
be expected to succeed. For Douglas, each case addressing the 
Holocaust is presented as a more or less unique artifact that may suc­
ceed or fail depending on the balance of forces pulling toward juridical 
limits and didactic narrative. What is missing from both these views is 
any explanation or deeper appreciation of the apparent growth of in­
ternational willingness to pursue criminals. Thompson's conception of 
the growth of the rule of law provides a powerful insight into why 
global receptivity has increased. It also helps us understand why the 
trajectory of trial developments over time is important. That trajectory 
or history can strengthen the limits on human rights abuse. The proc­
ess, however, is not ineluctable. To encourage the growth of legal con-
55. EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 
(1975) . 
56. See, e.g. , id. at 136 (tenants successful at Winchester Assizes on question of cutting 
beech trees); id. at 51 (grand jury refused to indict local landowner accused of interfering 
with red deer in Windsor); id. at 79 (despite vigorous prosecution, many defendants were 
acquitted in criminal proceedings at Wallingford). 
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straints, the importance of each case in reinforcing the power of law 
must be appreciated. In this light, the risks inherent in the 
Nuremberg/ Eichmann approach must be recognized and corrected. 
The fact that this was not done in cases like Demjanjuk threatens to 
undermine progress. 
One alternative to criminal trials discussed by all four authors is 
the truth commission - a body charged with the duty of uncovering 
the truth about certain historical events rather than prosecuting spe­
cific defendants.57 The truth commission separates the second of the 
two Nuremberg tracks from the effort to prosecute and makes the 
creation of an accurate record an end in itself. The authors of all the 
books under review are skeptical about the value of truth commissions 
as a substitute for prosecutions.58 But all note that the truth commis­
sion idea is one that has been repeatedly suggested and, sometimes, 
tried. Bass reports that after World War I, when the British and 
French were pushing for the prosecution of the Kaiser, the Americans 
(who were opposed to the trial idea) proposed instead "an Interna­
tional Commission of Inquiry be instituted to investigate and report 
upon the extent of the responsibility of the ex-Kaiser" (p. 101). This 
proposal was rejected as an unsatisfactory substitute for a trial, a con­
clusion with which Bass seems to agree. Wilhelm II was never prose­
cuted and no definitive record of World War I misdeeds was ever cre­
ated. 
Douglas too considers truth commission proposals, most particu­
larly that made by Karl Jaspers in response to the Eichmann trial. 
Jaspers saw the Eichmann case as presenting a problem beyond the 
competence of a normal court of law and suggested that it might "be 
wonderful to do without the trial altogether and make it instead into a 
process of examination and clarification" (p. 175). Douglas rejects the 
Jaspers proposal as lacking the legitimacy and closure of a true legal 
proceeding. For Douglas, effective "pedagogy" (p. 175) cannot be 
achieved by entities like truth commissions. He recognizes the risk of 
distortion engendered by combining pedagogy with prosecution but 
thinks such risks are worth taking - the Demjanjuk example notwith­
standing. Goldstone for his part praises the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") as critical to that nation's transi­
tion to democracy but is at pains to emphasize the special healing 
power of ICTY prosecutions. Finally, Robertson dismisses truth com­
missions as incapable of addressing serious human rights abuses. He 
sees them as an inadequate response to extreme criminal conduct and 
57. See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A 
Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994). 
58. The one possible exception is Justice Goldstone, who emphasizes the value of South 
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Pp. 59-73. He, however, highlights the need 
for prosecutorial action in the Balkans. Pp. 74-119. 
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declares "transitional justice [including truth commissions] is a contra­
diction in terms" (pp. 270-71).  
While there is merit to all the authors' criticisms of truth commis­
sions, there is also a great deal to recommend such bodies. They may 
be brought into being fairly quickly after transition to democracy or 
the end of hostilities. They are not bound by the legal constraints that 
require the highest standard of proof for individual conviction. In 
situations where thousands of victims and potential defendants may 
exist, truth commissions can address vast numbers of individuals and 
help begin their reintegration into society. Goldstone makes this pre­
cise point when he notes that the South African TRC heard 20,000 vic­
tim witnesses and received 8,000 applications for amnesty. Goldstone 
concludes that "the same result [could not] have been achieved 
through the normal criminal process. It would have taken scores of 
long and costly trials to have recorded the history of the human rights 
abuses perpetrated during the apartheid era" (p. 71). With this back­
ground in mind, Goldstone suggests that there might be a place for 
both a truth commission and trials in the Balkans. 
Out of this final Goldstone observation a new strategy with regard 
to two-track trials might be formulated. Rather than encumber each 
criminal trial with the costly and risky obligation of proving the vast 
and complex nature of atrocity, why not use a single truth commission 
proceeding for that purpose? Such a trial could fairly safely be con­
ducted with relaxed evidence rules because no defendant would be di­
rectly threatened by either erroneous factual findings or prejudice. 
The commission charged with such a task would obviously need broad 
investigative powers and ample staff. It would need both prosecutorial 
and judicial independence from any interested party. It would also 
need an effective defense staff comprised of appropriate interveners 
and/or "devil's advocates" to guard against distortion and fabrications. 
The findings of such a body might warrant judicial notice in later pro­
ceedings. Such notice could operate in the manner contemplated by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 - establishing certain propositions as 
accurate and reliable.59 Room, however, might be left for an individual 
defendant in a later case to challenge personally incriminating find­
ings. Such a procedure could decouple the two-track process while 
serving both prosecutorial and pedagogic goals. 
59. See FED. R. Evrn. 201. 
